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I.

INTRODUCTION

In its opening brief, the Idaho Department of Transportation ("Department") presented the
relevant facts. Those facts are incorporated herein by this reference. In sum, the Appellee, Susan Jane
Warner ("Warner"), committed a DUI in Idaho in 2012, and then a second DUI in Montana less than
two years later. The Department suspended her license for one year upon notification of her second
DUL The district court reversed that decision and imposed a suspension for only thirty days.
Warner argues that the Department treated her differently solely because her DUI conviction
occurred in another jurisdiction. She argues that Idaho is bound by the form of the Montana DUI
conviction and punishment, and cannot impose a license suspension greater than that allowed for a first
offense DUI because that comprised the substance of her punishment in Montana. Warner also argues
that an application of the Idaho statutes resulting in a one-year suspension would violate two
constitutional rights.
However, Warner is attempting to exploit the differences between Montana and Idaho DUI laws
to do exactly what she accuses the Department of doing-obtain different treatment solely because her
second DUI was in Montana and not in Idaho. Additionally, Warner fails to demonstrate how a oneyear license suspension for a DUI infringes on any of her constitutional rights.

II.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

The Idaho statues governing administrative license suspensions are to ensure that drivers have
their licenses suspended for specified periods oftime each time they commit a DUL The legislature has
tried to cover each possible angle for that purpose, mandating automatic license suspensions upon
failing a BAC test in Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-8002A), mandating a license suspension upon the
conviction of a DUI in Idaho (Idaho Code § 18-8005), mandating an administrative license suspension
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when an Idaho court fails to impose the proper license suspension (Idaho Code § 49-326(a)), and
mandating an administrative license suspension when a driver commits a DUI in another jurisdiction
(Idaho Code §§ 49-3 24, 4 9-3 26(1 )(e))-which happens to be the issue in this case.
Idaho Code section 49-324 states, in part:
The department shall suspend, disquaiify or revoke the driver's license or privilege of
any resident of this state or the privilege of a nonresident to operate a motor vehicle in
this state upon receiving notice of the conviction, administrative action or court order
of that person in another state or jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this
state, would be grounds for the suspension, disqualification or revocation of the
driver's license and privileges of the driver.
(Emphasis added). Similarly, Idaho Code section 49-326(1 )(e) states that if a court has not suspended a
driver's license, the Department must suspend that license if the driver, "[h]as committed an offense in
another state or jurisdiction as evidenced by a conviction, court order or administrative action, which if

committed in Idaho would be grounds for suspension, disqualification or revocation" ofthe license.
(Emphasis added). 1
These statutes operate alongside the other license suspension statutes to bring uniformity to all
and to ensure all Idaho-licensed drivers are subject to the same driving privilege consequences for
drinking and driving. These statutes do not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the right to travel as
they bring uniformity to all regardless of where the DUI offense is committed.

A.

IDAHO CODE SECTIONS 49-324 AND 49-326 DO NOT OPERATE TO TREAT
PEOPLE DIFFERENTLY, BUT TO BRING UNIFORMITY TO ALL-IN-STATE
OFFENDERS AND OUT-OF-STATE OFFENDERS.
Warner argues that, even though her Montana DUI was her second DUI, she can only be subject

this case, the underlying ground for suspension is Idaho Code section 18-8005, which provides that for a DUI, a
license is to be suspended for 30 days absolute, followed by 60 days with restrictions. An enhancement in that statute
is if the driver has at least one other DUI in the past IO years in which case, if there is only one other DUI, the
suspension is for one-year absolute.
1 In
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to an Idaho license suspension for a first offense DUI because she was not convicted of a second
offense DUI inMontana.2 Warner's position misunderstands the role of the foreign convictions in the
Idaho administrative license suspension statutes and is an attempt to exploit the differences between
Idaho DUI statutes and Montana DUI statutes to her advantage, thereby thwarting the intentional
uniformity underlying the license suspension statutes.

In its opening brief, the Department noted that Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )(e)
direct the Department to focus on whether the offense of a DUI was committed in another jurisdiction,
and does not direct the Department to pay attention to how the foreign jurisdiction punishes that DUL
Both Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )(e) are very clear in this regard-the Department looks
at the foreign "conviction, court order, or administrative action" as evidence that an "offense" has been
committed. In DUI cases, the "offense" is the DUI itself, not the enhancement available for the number
DUI it happens to be. See State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488,493, 337P.3d 647,652 (2014) (the offense at
issue is the violation ofldaho Code section 18-8004 [DUI] and that very offense may be charged either
as a misdemeanor or a felony depending upon the defendant's prior criminal history.").
The purpose for the emphasis on the "offense" and not the form of the conviction is so that all
Idaho-licensed drivers are treated equally-in-state and out-of-state-even when foreign jurisdictions
have differing DUI laws. For example, as previously noted by the Department, Idaho counts all DUis,
regardless of jurisdiction, when calculating the number ofDUis for punishment purposes. See Idaho
Code Section 18-8005(4) ('Any person who pleads guilty or is found guilty of a violation of the
provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, who previously has been found guilty of or
has pled guilty to a violation of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, or any

2

Warner continues to reference her Montana DUI as a "first offense DUI." Resp. Brief, p. 7. That is inaccurate. Her
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substantially conforming foreign criminal violation withln ten (10) years ... "). However, Montana does
not count foreign jurisdiction DUis when determining the punishment enhancement for a DUL See
Montana Code Annotated ("MCA") § 61-8-714(2)(a) ("a person convicted of a second violation of 618-401 ... ); MCA§ 61-8-401 (declaring it unlawful to operate a motor vehlcle while under the influence
of alcohol "upon the way of this state [Montana] open to the public"). Therefore, while Warner's
Montana DUI would be punished as a second DUI had it been committed in thls state, it could not be
punished as a second DUI in Montana because her first DUI was not committed in Montana. Warner
seeks unequal treatment-to her benefit-because her second DUI occurred in a foreign jurisdiction.
Interpretations that provide drivers a "free bite," such as the one Warner is attempting to obtain,
are contrary to the purpose of the license suspension statutes and are not supported by Idaho appellate
courts. In In re Bowman, 135 Idaho 843,844, 25 P.3d 866,867 (Ct. App. 2001). a driver was arrested
for a DUI and submitted a blood test. Approximately one month later, before the blood test results were
received, the driver was again arrested for a DUI but thls time provided a breath test. Id. Having failed
the breath test, the Department immediately suspended his driver's license for ninety days. Id. When
the blood test results were completed, showing that the driver's BAC from the first arrest was .19, the
Department issued a notice that the driver's suspension would be for one year. Id. After the driver
unsuccessfully challenged the suspension at a hearing, the district court reversed the one-year
suspension for a second DUI and implemented the suspension for a first DUI. Id. The Department
appealed. Id.
The issue on appeal was the interpretation of the phrase, "failure of evidentiary testing." Id. at
845, 25 P.3d at 868. The Court of Appeals held that "evidentiary testing refers to the completed series

Montana DUI was an "Aggravated DUI." R. at 22.
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of procedures" to determine the BAC and therefore the driver had not failed the evidentiary testing until
the testing was completed. Id. at 846, 25 P.3d at 869. After interpreting the statute, the Court stated,
"Both test results indicated that Bowman had been driving on two separate occasions while his bloodalcohol concentration exceeded the legal limit" and that the driver's one-year license suspension was
proper, reversing the district court. Id. After ruiing, the Court noted that its interpretation of the statute
"complies with the legislative purpose underlying the administrative license suspension
statute ... [which is] to provide maximum safety for all persons using the highways" by revoking the
licenses of intoxicated drivers. Id. The Court observed that the driver's interpretation of the statute
"would allow a person to avoid a one-year suspension although alcohol concentration tests indicate that
the person was driving under the influence on two separate occasions within a five-year period." Id. at
847, 25 P.3d at 870. The Court stated that such a "free bite" "would contradict the legislative purpose
underlying" the administrative license suspensions. Id.
The concern over DUI offenders exploiting the differences in DUl laws between jurisdictions in
order to obtain a "free bite" is precisely why the legislature instructs the Department to focus on the
"offense" and not the form of the conviction or the punishment foreign jurisdictions impose. The
legislature was exhibiting awareness or foresight that other jurisdictions may not calculate prior DUis
the same as Idaho. Thus, in order to maintain uniformity between those who offend in Idaho and those
who offend in other jurisdictions, the legislature instructs the Department in Idaho Code sections 49324 and 49-326(l)(e) to look at the offense and apply the suspension as though the offense was
committed in this state without regard as to how other jurisdictions choose to punish those offenses.
That is precisely what the Department did in Warner's case. Had she committed her Montana DUI in
Idaho, she would be subject to a one-year suspension. However, if the Department was limited to the
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 7

form of the Montana conviction, where Warner could not be punished for a second DUI, then Warner
would get the "free bite" that the legislature and Idaho appellate courts have refused to permit. In
theory, and assuming that all other 49 states have DUI laws mirroring Montana's, such a "free bite"
interpretation could result in Warner being able to commit 50 DUis in 50 different states within a tenyear period without having her Idaho license suspended for one year at a single time.

In furtherance of the legislature's goal to bring uniformity to license suspensions, the legislature
has directed the Department to suspend licenses in civil proceedings. The Idaho Court of Appeals has
recognized the nature of an administrative license suspension, stating such "is a civil penalty separate
and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation of other Idaho motor vehicle codes or
for a conviction of an offense." Id. at 845, 25 P.3d at 868. Notwithstanding this fact, Warner attempts
to remove this case from the civil arena by relying on State v. Halford, 124 Idaho 411, 860 P .2d 27
(Ct. App. 1993). In Halford, a criminal defendant was charged and pled guilty to a DUL Id. at 412,
860 P.2d at 28. Despite any mention in the criminal complaint that this DUI charged should be
"enhanced" due to prior DUis, the court issued an "enhanced" criminal punishment for the DUL Id.
The defendant appealed, arguing that he could not be subjected to the "enhanced" penalties because
he did not plead guilty to the enhancement. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that the

court's sentence, "which exceed[ ed] the maximum incarceration, fine and license suspension for an
unenhanced misdemeanor DUI [was] contrary to law." Id. at 414, 860 P.2d at 30.
Unlike Halford, this case involves a civil remedy to protect drivers on Idaho roads and not a
criminal punishment. Where in a criminal case courts are bound by the form of the complaint for the
offenses and enhancements charged, the Department is not so restricted by the form of a foreign
judgment when identifying and evaluating offenses committed in other jurisdictions in order to
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 8

determine the proper suspension as though those offenses were committed in this state. This case
does not present an issue of exceeding criminal sentencing maximums, but addresses the appropriate
civil license suspension for a driver who committed her second DUI in a foreign state-a state that,
unlike Idaho, does not recognize her first DUI. To bind this civil case to a criminal case and the
doctrines applied therein would effectively can into question the principle that administrative license
suspensions are civil remedies "separate and apart from any other suspension imposed for a violation
of other Idaho motor vehicle codes for a conviction of an offense" (Bowman, 135 Idaho at 845, 25
P.3d at 868), and run contrary to the Idaho Court of Appeals' more recent observation that "Idaho
appellate courts have not viewed driver's license suspensions as punishment." Buell v. Idaho Dept. of
Transp., 151 Idaho 257,263,254 P.3d 1253, 1259 (2011).
The administrative license suspension statutes were enacted to provide "safety for all persons
using the highways of this state by quickly revoking the driving privileges of those persons who have
shown themselves to be safety hazards by driving" under the influence. State v. Talavera, 127 Idaho
700, 705, 905 P.2d 633, 638 (1995). The legislature authorized the Department to immediately revoke
licenses of those who fail evidentiary tests in Idaho, those who are convicted of a DUI in Idaho but do
not have their licenses suspended, and to suspend the licenses of those who commit DUis in foreign
jurisdictions in an obvious attempt to ensure that no Idaho-licensed person committing a DUI would
slip through the cracks. Contrary to the purpose and intent of the administrative license suspension
statutes, Warner is attempting to exploitthe differences between Montana's DUI laws and Idaho's DUI
laws so that she can evade the suspension she would have received had she committed the Montana
DUI offense in Idaho. Warner's attempt is contrary to the purpose and language of the administrative
license suspension statutes.
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B.

A ONE-YEAR SUSPENSION DOES NOT VIOLATE WARNER'S CONSTITUIONAL
RIGHTS.
Warner additionally argues that a one-year license suspension for her Montana DUI violates her

Constitutional rights as she is being treated differently for her Montana conviction than a person in
Idaho with an identical conviction. Her Constitutional arguments are insupportable because she has not
been treated differently than those who have their second DUis in Idaho and her right to travel is not
infringed by suspending her license after she commits a DUI offense.

1.

Warner has not demonstrated a violation ofthe Equal Protection Clause.

Warner claims that the one-year license suspension would violate the Equal Protection Clause.
However, Warner fails to demonstrate that she is being treated any differently than a person who
commits his or her second DUI in Idaho.
An equal protection violation claim requires, at a minimum, 1) an identified classification, 2)
the standard upon which the classification will be reviewed. State v. Rogerson, 132 Idaho 53, 56-57,
966 P.2d 53, 56-57 (Ct. App. 1998). It appears that Warner is arguing that her classification would be
those who are convicted ofDUis in foreign jurisdictions.
As noted above, the claim of unequal treatment based upon this classification is false. In Idaho,
a person who commits a second DUI within ten years is subject to the consequences of a second DUI,
which includes receiving a one-year license suspension, regardless of whether the first DUI was in
Idaho or another jurisdiction. However, a person who commits a second DUI in Montana when the first
DUI was in a foreign jurisdiction is not subject to the consequences of a second DUL Therefore, when
applying Idaho Code sections 49-324 and 49-326(1 )(e), as they relate to section 18-8005, a first DUI
offender in Montana is not necessarily the same as a first DUI offender in Idaho and cannot be
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compared for purposes of establishing whether unequal treatment has occurred.
Even if Montana's DUI laws mirrored Idaho's, the imposition of a one-year suspension when
Montana chooses to charge the second DUI as a first DUI still does not violate the Equal Protection
Clause. Courts apply three potential standards of review for equal protection violation analysis: 1) strict
scrutiny for suspect classifications such as those based upon race, 2) intermediate scrutiny for those
cases where "the state action in question creates obviously and invidiously discriminatory
classifications," and 3) rational basis test where "a classification will be upheld if it is rationally related
to a legitimate government objective." Id. The claim of unequal treatment is not based upon a suspect
classification, nor is it an obviously discriminatory classification. Therefore, the constitutional test to
apply is whether using foreign judgments solely for the purpose of evidencing a DUI occurredwithout regard to the punishment enforced by that foreign jurisdiction-is rationally related to a
legitimate government objective.
This case demonstrates the government objective and its legitimacy in this alleged unequal
treatment. Idaho issues and controls Idaho driving privileges. Idaho has a strong public interest in
protecting Idaho's roads from those who choose to drink and drive and regulating its Idaho-issued
driving privileges. By not limiting the Department's purview to the punishment applied in a foreign
conviction, the Idaho legislature demonstrates its desire to be the one who determines the length of
suspension for Idaho-issued driving privileges instead ofleaving it to the whim of a foreign jurisdiction.
To limit Idaho and its ability to extend driving privileges and protect the drivers on its own highways to
the decisions of foreign jurisdictions based upon their own laws and interests in cases where Idaho has
no input or decision-making ability is illogical.
An illustration is appropriate to demonstrate this legitimate government objective. Assuming
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 11

that Montana and Idaho's laws are the same and Warner commits her second DUI. If that DUI is
committed in Idaho, she is prosecuted by the State ofldaho and the State ofldaho determines whether it
is in this State's best interests to proceed with a DUI or an enhanced DUL Therefore, in this scenario,
Idaho makes the decisions about the charged enhancement, and consequently what will happen with
Warner's Idaho-issued driving privileges. However, if Warner's second DUI is in Montana, then Idaho
has no say about whether an enhancement is charged or not, even though an enhancement is
appropriate. Ifthe Department was forced to apply the suspension that fit the form of Montana's chosen
punishment, then Idaho, the safety of its roads and the control ofits driving privileges, would be at the
mercy of Montana's decisions and prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, looking at the judgment of
conviction from the other jurisdiction solely for the purpose to determine the offense-as opposed to
being limited to the foreign punishment-allows Idaho to maintain control over its interests of
protecting Idaho roads and regulating Idaho-issued driving privileges.
Warner has not demonstrated unequal treatment. She benefitted from the differences in laws
between Idaho and Montana to avoid the second DUI enhancement in her criminal conviction.
However, had she committed the same offense in Idaho-which is the standard under Idaho Code
sections 49-3 24 and 49-326(1 )(e)-she would be subject to a second DUI enhancement and, therefore
no unequal treatment is found. Additionally, the focus on the offense and not the conviction is
rationally related to the legitimate interest of allowing Idaho to decide, independent of the decisions of
foreign jurisdictions, how to protect its own roads and regulate Idaho-issued driving privileges.

2.

Warner has not demonstrated a violation of her right to travel.

Warner has also alleged a violation to her right to travel. Although Warner's exact position is
unclear, it appears that Warner is arguing that ifldaho counts how many DUis an Idaho-licensed driver
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF- 12

has when suspending a license based upon a DUI committed in another state, Warner's ability to drink
and drive in another state is impinged. Such an argument is nonsensical.
The "right to travel" discussed in our cases embraces at least three different
components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another
State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when
temporarily present in the second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become
permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500, (1999). The "right to travel" encapsulates the "right of free ingress
and regress to and from neighboring states .... " Id. (internal quotes omitted).
Reviewing Warner's argument, it is unclear how Idaho's treatment of foreign DUis with
regards to Idaho's driving privileges affects a driver's ability to enter and leave foreign states. If
consequences to crimes were sufficient reason to violate the right to travel, then all criminal laws
would have to be uniform among the states or else a violation of the right to travel would occur any
time a person commits a crime in one state that is punished more harshly than the same crime in
another state.
Examples of right to travel violation challenges demonstrate that Idaho's suspension of
Warner's license following her second DUI is not a violation of her right to travel. The Supreme
Court of the United States determined that a state's welfare scheme that treated new Californian
residents different was a violation of this right. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). In Gordon v.

State, 108 Idaho 178,697 P.2d 1192 (Ct. App. 1985), the Court of Appeals ofldaho determined that
the laws requiring a vehicle operator to be licensed, register his vehicle, and carry insurance coverage
did not violate the right to travel. In Gordon, the Court of Appeals recognized a sister jurisdiction's
observation that "[t]he exercise of [the right to travel] the city may, under its police power, regulate
in the interest of the public safety and welfare ... " Id. at 180,697 P.2d at 1194. In another case, the
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Supreme Court ofldaho determined that a court order stripping a custodial parent's custody if she
moved out of Idaho did implicate the parent's right to travel, but that such restriction was necessary
to serve a compelling government interest-that the best interests of the children be effectuated.

Bartosz v. Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 462-63, 197 P.3d 310, 323-24 (2008).
Perhaps most similar to this case is State v. Yeoman, i 49 Idaho 505,236 P.3d 1265 (20i 0). In

Yeoman, a criminal defendant was convicted of rape in Washington in 1984 and required to register
as a sex offender. Id. at 506,236 P.3d at 1266. He moved to Idaho in 2007. Id. He was subsequently
charged for failing to register as a sex offender. Id. After his conviction, he appealed. Id. The issues
on appeal involved the interpretation ofldaho Code sections 18-8301 to 18-8326, which were the
Idaho sex offender registration laws. Id. Specifically, the registration requirements in Idaho applied
only to those applicable sex crimes that occurred on or after July 1, 1993, but in 2005 the legislature
added an additional provision, requiring the registration of those offenders who committed sex
crimes in foreign jurisdictions and would be required to register there as a sex offender. Id.
The defendant argued that because his Washington sex crime occurred prior to July 1, 1993,
it should not be counted for purposes of registering as a sex offender in Idaho. Id. The defendant
argued that "the statute in question clearly treats an in-state sex offender differently than it would a
similarly situated out-of-state sex offender" and that such violated his right to travel and the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 508, 236 P.3d at 1268. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the
statute did not implicate his right to travel because he would have to register as a sex offender in
Washington but that if it did, it satisfied a "compelling state interest" because the state had a "strong
interest in preventing future sexual offenses and alerting local law enforcement and citizens to the
whereabouts of those that could reoffend." Id. at 508-09, 236 P.3d at 1268-69.
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Similarly, Warner's right to travel is not infringed upon by a one-year suspension. Had
Warner committed her second DUI in Idaho, she would have been subject to a one-year suspension
just like any other Idaho-licensed driver who commits their second DUI in Idaho or out ofldaho. She
is not entitled to a "free bite" just because she committed the second DUI in a jurisdiction that does
not count her Idaho DUI. Additionaily, even if her license suspension implicated her right to travel,
the one-year suspension satisfies a compelling government interest as Idaho has a strong interest in
regulating those to whom it grants driving privileges and to keep drivers safe on Idaho roads.
Application ofldaho's driver's license suspension statutes does not impinge on Warner's
ability to travel to other states-it only impinges on her ability to drink and drive, which is not a
protected right. Warner is free to visit other states. However, in order to keep her driver's license
valid, she is not free to drink and drive in this state, or any other state that will prosecute her for a
DUI offense.

III.

CONCLUSION

For the second time in less than two years, Warner operated a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol. The Hearing Officer correctly reviewed Warner's Montana conviction to ensure
that Warner had committed a DUI in Montana, and then affirmed the civil one-year license suspension
because Warner had a previous DUI. The Court should reverse the district court's decision and reinstate
the license suspension.
DATED this

1st

day of February, 2016.
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